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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waive his right to counsel?
Whether defendant properly waived his right to counsel
presents a mixed question of law and fact.

State v. Heaton, 958

P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 78081 (Utah App. 1996)(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39
(Utah 1994)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions or statutes are necessary to
the resolution of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with seven drug and firearm-related
crimes, including three felony offenses and four misdemeanors.
R. 2-3.

He was also presented with a notice and demand for

forfeiture of property, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13
(1996).

Id.

Following a jury trial at which defendant

represented himself with an appointed public defender serving as
standby counsel, defendant was convicted of five of the offenses:
possession of a clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony;
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second
degree felony; possession or use of drug paraphernalia in a drugfree zone, a class A misdemeanor; carrying a loaded firearm in a

2

motor vehicle, a class B misdemeanor; and speeding, a class C
misdemeanor.

R. 268-70.

The court sentenced defendant to five years to life on the
first degree felony; one-to-fifteen years on the second degree
felony; and one year, six months, and 90 days respectively on the
class A, B, and C misdemeanors.

The court ordered all sentences

to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to the sentence
defendant was already serving.

R. 269. The court additionally

ordered defendant to pay $1850 in fines, accorded him no credit
for time served, and recommended long-term drug therapy and
mental health counseling.

Id.

This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A Utah County deputy sheriff, after stopping a speeding
vehicle driven by defendant, smelled the odor of marijuana
emanating from the .car (R. 363: 88, 90-91, 93). A subsequent
warrants check revealed that defendant was wanted for a Utah
parole violation and that he was the subject of an outstanding
FBI warrant.

The dispatcher "advised [the deputy] to use extreme

caution, that [defendant] was often armed" (Id. at 121).
Defendant was arrested.

Searching the vehicle for weapons

incident to the arrest, the deputy located a fully-loaded handgun
under the driver's seat (Id. at 94, 96-97).

He also found a full

box of handgun ammunition, a marijuana roach, cigarette rolling
papers, and broken glass bearing what appeared to be

3

methamphetamine residue (Id. at 101-04) . Later in the
investigation, officers discovered duffle bags in the trunk of
the vehicle containing equipment and supplies associated with a
clandestine laboratory (Id. at 106-10) . After receiving Miranda
warnings, defendant admitted he was transporting a clamdestine
laboratory in exchange for payment of $10,000 (Id. at 113-14).
Defendant was reincarcerated pursuant to the outstanding
parole violation warrant (Id. at 114). The trial court appointed
Steven Killpack to represent him.

From the beginning, defendant

filed pro se documents independent of those filed by his
appointed counsel, asked that the public defender's office be
fired, and maintained that he wanted private counsel from New
Mexico (R. 22, 34, 38-49, 83-84, 105-06, 130, 133-48, 193-202,
221-66, 276-77, 333) . The court repeatedly discussed the issue
with defendant prior to trial; found no actual conflict with
Killpack; warned defendant that he either needed to secure his
own counsel, use the public defender, or represent himself;
informed defendant of the seriousness of the pending charges; and
advised him multiple times against proceeding pro se (R. 361: 57;
R. 362: 6-13; R. 363: 14-16).

Ultimately, defendant chose to

represent himself at trial, and the court ordered Killpack to
serve as advisory or standby counsel (R. 363: 5, 14-16, 29)-1

1

Killpack secured pretrial discovery, a preliminary
hearing transcript, police reports, and crime lab reports, all of
which he shared with defendant. Killpack also succeeded in
4

Continuing discussions in which the court urged defendant to use
or consult with his court-appointed counsel punctuated the trial
by jury (R. 363: 225; R. 364: 5, 33, 35; R. 367: 17, 19) .2
Following trial, defendant was convicted of five of the charged
crimes (R. 268-70) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his right to counsel.

The colloquy and the

extensive ongoing discussion of the matter, however, reveal that
the court provided defendant with adequate information on which
to base his choice to waive counsel.

Consequently, the waiver

was intelligent, as that term is used in this context.
Defendant has only barely averred that his waiver of counsel
was not knowing or voluntary and, for that reason alone, his
argument may be waived.

Even on the merits, the claim fails

because an unjustified rejection of court-appointed counsel is
properly deemed a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.

having the marijuana re-tested at defendant's request (R. 32, 45,
201, 330; R. 362: 10-12). Further, although Killpack did not
argue or examine witnesses at trial, he did consult off-therecord with defendant (R. 193-202).
2

The matter was also discussed at sentencing and at a
post-trial motions hearing (R. 365: 5, 25, 32-35; R. 366: 3-4,
16-18).
5

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON
WHICH "TO BASE HIS WAIVER OF COUNSEL, HIS
WAIVER WAS INTELLIGENT; IF THE COURT REACHES
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS WAIVER WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY OR KNOWING, THAT ARGUMENT FAILS ON
THE MERITS BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF
COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL WAS UNJUSTIFIED
Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily, intelligently,
and knowingly waive his right to counsel.3

Br. of App. at 24.

Specifically, he contends that the colloquy initiated by the
trial court prior to his waiver was insufficient to establish
that he: 1)understood the seriousness of the pending charges;
2)knew the maximum penalty he could face if convicted; and
3)understood the actual risks of self-representation.
23-24.

Id. at 17,

Given these deficiencies, defendant asserts, his

convictions should be reversed.

Id. at 17, 24.

In the context of waiving the right to counsel, the words
''knowing/7 "voluntary," and "intelligent" all carry specific
connotations:
"Intelligent" . . . means "only that the
defendant has been provided with adequate
information on which to make his or her selfrepresentation choice. Because such a choice
is seldom, if ever, a wise one, 'intelligent'
does not carry that meaning here." State v.

3

Defendant does not dispute that he waived his right to
counsel. That is, by arguing that his waiver was not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent, defendant concedes that he factually
waived his right to counsel, but that the waiver was legally
defective because it did not comport with constitutional
standards. .See, e.g., Br. of App. at 17.
6

Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 732 n.ll (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
"Knowing" refers to a defendant's competence
to waive the right to counsel, similar to a
defendant's competence to stand trial, id. at
731 n.ll, while "voluntary" means "free from
official coercion, even if not free from the
influence of a mental disorder," id. at 732
n.ll.
State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah App. 1996).
Defendant's general claim, while employing the alternative
phraseology of "knowing, intelligent, or voluntary," is at its
core an attack on the intelligent nature of the waiver.
That is, defendant specifically asserts only that the trial court
did not provide him with sufficient relevant information on which
to base a decision to represent himself.
The law is well-settled that the trial court must determine
whether a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is
intelligent.

See, e.g., State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, J23, 979

P.2d 799; State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987).
Plainly, whether a defendant has made an intelligent waiver is a
fact-sensitive inquiry, turning on the circumstances of the
particular case.

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.

The preferred and most efficient way of ensuring the
intelligent nature of a waiver is for the trial court to engage
defendant in an in-depth colloquy on the record, fully informing
defendant "of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows

7

what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."
187 (citations omitted).

Id. at

While Frampton provided a sample

colloquy of inquiries, the court made clear that defendant's
background, while relevant to assess his capability to waive
counsel, "is not relevant to show whether a sensible, literate,
and intelligent defendant possesses the necessary information to
make a meaningful decision as to waiver of counsel."

Id. at 188.

The responsibility both for providing the necessary
information to defendant and for deciding whether the waiver is
intelligent rests, as it should, with the trial court, which "having the benefit of questioning the defendant and observing
his demeanor" - is optimally situated to evaluate the factual
circumstances prompting the waiver.

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d

911, 918 (Utah 1998); cf. C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics,
Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah App. 1995)(citing State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)(reviewing court defers to trial court
on credibility matters because trial court has observed
"witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application
of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record
available to appellate courts"))•

From a policy perspective, a

record colloquy makes good sense because it documents the waiver
inquiry and ensures that the reviewing court will not usurp the
trial court's role by scanning a cold record and fabricating an

8

intelligent waiver out of whole cloth.4
In this case, defendant concedes that the trial court
engaged in a colloquy but asserts that the colloquy was
insufficient in and of itself to establish the intelligent nature
of his waiver.

Br. of App. at 23. Here, however, in addition to

the colloquy, the trial court engaged defendant in a pattern of
conversation over several hearings, exploring defendant's desire
for substitute counsel and the relationship of defendant's
insistence on substitute counsel to waiver of counsel and selfrepresentation.5

Because the supreme court's concern that a

reviewing court not usurp the proper role of the trial court is
not implicated here, neither Heaton nor the reasonable policy
underlying it precludes looking at the record as a whole to

4

Thus, the court in Heaton observed that, in the absence
of any kind of meaningful inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding a waiver, a reviewing court should be "reluctant to
assume the important responsibility which has been placed upon
the trial court" by reviewing the record de novo. Heaton, 958
P.2d at 918.
5

Contrast both Frampton and Heaton, where the trial court
had wholly failed to ensure that defendant's waiver of counsel
was intelligently made. In Frampton, when defendant asserted
that he wanted to represent himself, the court merely advised him
that he had a constitutional right to do so and then appointed
standby counsel. Frampton/ 737 P.2d at 186. In Heaton,
following a hearing at which both defendant and his counsel
acknowledged a "rift" between them, the court advised defendant
of his right to self-representation, refused to allow counsel to
withdraw, required counsel to continue on in a "standby" capacity
despite the articulated rift, and told defendant that he "was
free to choose to handle trial matters on his own but that the
court would make a record of Heaton's decision to proceed pro
se." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914.
9

supplement the trial court's colloquy with defendant.
Furthermore, the law is well-settled that "this court upholds the
trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually
made such findings."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 n.6

(Utah 1991).
First, from the record of defendant's pretrial conference,
it is clear that defendant knew the maximum penalty he faced if
convicted.

In asserting that he wanted different counsel due to

a conflict of interest, defendant stated: wI'm fixing to go to
trial on five to life, and I don't even have a defense" (R. 362:
7).

Shortly thereafter, once again requesting new counsel,

defendant stated: "I need somebody that is going to represent me
on these five to life" (Id. at 8). Later in the same hearing,
the trial court clarified that "on these first degree felonies .
. . you could spend the rest of your life in prison, Mr.
VanCleave. . ."

(Id.).

That defendant understood the maximum

sentence is attested to by his subsequent comment: "I would like
another attorney, a different attorney . . so I don't have to
spend the rest of my life in Utah State Prison" (Id. at 9) .
Later, defendant reminded the court, "You know, you're aware that
I'm trying to fight for the rest of my life here, your Honor"
(Id. at 10) .
Second, as to the seriousness of the pending charges, during

10

the same exchange, the trial court stated to defendant:
It's my understanding, Mr. Roger VanCleave,
at each and every stage of these proceedings
I have attempted to appoint counsel for you,
advising you that Count I is a first degree
felony, Count II is a first degree felony,
Count III is a second degree felony,
possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person. Count IV is possession or
use of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor.
Count V is a class A misdemeanor, Count VI is
a loaded firearm in a (inaudible) vehicle, a
class B misdemeanor, Count VII is a
misdemeanor . . . and at each and every stage
of these proceedings I have indicated to you,
'You need counsel.'
Id. at 7. To this litany, defendant responded, "Correct,"
reflecting his clear understanding of the gravity of the charges

(I£J •
By the time of trial, the court had discussed the issue of
substitute counsel and the alternative of pro se representation
with defendant on multiple occasions (R. 360: 39-40; R. 361: 57;
R. 362: 8-13).

Immediately before trial began, the court once

again engaged defendant in conversation to resolve "a critical
issue before we proceed" (R. 363: 15). The court reiterated that
it did not recommend that defendant proceed pro se, once again
highlighting the severity of the charges: "I've told you at all
stages of this case that these are serious charges, and that I
think your case is best served by having a seasoned expert . . .
to be your advocate in this case. That has been my
recommendation at all stages.

I don't depart from it now" (Id.

11

at 16) . Plainly, defendant was cognizant of the seriousness of
the pending charges.
Third, defendant was well aware of the risks of selfrepresentation.

"Of all the guidelines recommended in Frampton,

the court's recommendation against self-representation probablybest ensures the defendant will understand the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation."
785.

McDonald, 922 P.2d at

In this case, the trial court amply fulfilled its

responsibility.

During the colloquy on the morning of trial, the

court told defendant that if he chose to proceed pro se, he would
be the only spokesperson for the defense: he would call,
interrogate and cross examine witnesses; he would offer an
opening statement and closing argument (R. 363 at 14-16).

The

court told defendant to confer with his standby counsel
throughout the proceedings, consult with him on procedural
matters, and ensure that all relevant inquiries had been explored
in direct and cross examination (Id. at 16) .6 The court also
admonished defendant that self-representation was not a good idea
and that he strongly recommended against it (Id.).

6

These statements implied that defendant needed to comply
with procedural rules. During the trial, suggesting once again
that defendant use his attorney, the court explicitly stated:
"This court has an obligation and responsibility to rule based
upon the rules of evidence. And my rulings have been consistent
with the rules of evidence. I will give you leave to consult
with your attorney, or to please reconsider and have your
attorney conduct the cross-examination, please" (R. 364: 33-34).
12

Throughout the trial, the court periodically highlighted the
risks of self-representation, urging defendant to reconsider his
decision to waive counsel.

Thus, the court closed the first

day's proceedings by stating:
We're going to end the day the way I started
the day, and that is to impress upon you, Mr.
Rodger VanCleave, the benefits that could
come from having Mr. Stephen Killpack
represent you as an attorney, both as to
motions, as to objections, as to crossexamination. You would be well served to
consider your decision to represent yourself.
That's the way I started the day, that's the
way I'm ending the day.
(Id. at 225) . The court opened the next day's proceedings in
much the same way, encouraging defendant to use his courtappointed counsel and informing him that although he had the
right to represent himself, he did so "at [his] own peril and
[his] own risk" (R. 364: 5). The court repeated its admonitions
to defendant periodically throughout the proceedings (R. 364: 3235; R. 367: 17, 19; R. 365: 25; R. 366: 3, 16).7

7

During a post-trial motions hearing, defendant questioned
whether he had been informed of the pitfalls of selfrepresentation. The court responded:
Didn't this court at every stage recommend
that you utilize the services of Mr. Killpack
who is a competent and capable and
professional attorney, who is also the
Director of the Public Defender's Office. He
has the most experience of any attorney
within the office. Frankly, may have as much
courtroom experience as all of the attorneys
put together within that office. Now I
advised you at every stage and recommended
13

Finally, defendant's insistence on substitute counsel
evidences his awareness of the risks of self-representation.
Indeed, the very fact that defendant repeatedly renewed his
demand for substitute counsel demonstrates that he knew he needed
counsel to represent him.

Thus, at his pretrial conference, when

the court raised the issue of self-representation, defendant
unequivocally stated, "I'm just asking for a different attorney.
I'm asking you for a different attorney.

I need somebody that is

going to represent me on these five to life . . . I'm not arguing
the fact that I want to represent myself" (R. 362: 8). This
statement illustrates that defendant was fully aware of the
gravity of the proceedings against him, and clearly understood
both the risks of proceeding pro se and the advantages to be
gained from having an attorney represent him.
Defendant's dogged insistence on substitute counsel is
important for a second reason, wholly apart from its evidentiary
value in demonstrating his knowledge of the risks of selfrepresentation.

Indeed, defendant's persistent demands for

substitute counsel go to the very heart of this case, to an issue

that you use Mr. Killpack's services. I
think it is disingenuous to say at this stage
that this court did not advise you relative
to the issues of pitfalls. That is
disingenuous.
R. 366: 16.

14

defendant has implicated only by the bare assertion that he did
not voluntarily waive his right to counsel.
At its crux, defendant's underlying argument is that his
waiver of counsel was not voluntary because the trial court's
refusal to appoint substitute counsel gave him no choice but to
represent himself.

Because defendant has not supported this

argument with any legal authority or argumentation, however, this
Court may decline to consider it on appeal.

State v. Wareham,

772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,
1344 (Utah 1984).
To the extent that this Court chooses to consider
defendant's unadorned claim that he did not voluntarily waive his
right to counsel, that claim must fail.

Utah courts have long

treated an unjustified rejection of court-appointed counsel as a
knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,
120 n.4; State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1987).
Certainly, a defendant has the right to either employ his own
counsel or, if indigent, be represented by a court-appointed
attorney. However,
he does not have an immutable right under the
sixth amendment of the United States
Constitution or under our state constitution
to reject court-appointed counsel for the
purpose of forcing the court to appoint
private counsel of his own choice to
represent him, absent a showing of good cause

15

for such a change. [9]
Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d at 121; accord Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, J20
n.4.
A showing of good cause puts a heavy burden on a defendant,
who must do more than merely show that he does not have a
"meaningful relationship" with his counsel or does not get along
with his counsel.

Indeed, defendant must show that "the

animosity resulted in such a deterioration of the attorney-client
relationship that the right to the effective assistance of
counsel was imperiled."

Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 622

(Utah 1995); accord State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah
App. 1987).

Further, the animosity or conflict must not "be

based solely on the defendant's illegitimate complaints or

8

That defendant was trying to force the court into
appointing substitute counsel of his choosing is clear from the
record. During a motions hearing, defendant made one of his
numerous requests for substitute counsel, arguing that his courtappointed attorney was not properly representing him (R. 360: 69, 33, 35-36). Pursuing the matter, the court queried, "Do you
believe that would be resolved by appointing other counsel?" (Id.
at 8). Defendant responded that it would (Id.). The court then
asked, "And if that counsel believes that your motions are not
meritorious, then what?" (Id.). Defendant replied, "Then I'll
ask for different counsel" (Id.). Despite the court's repeated
explanations, defendant simply would not accept any counsel's
obligation, as an officer of the court, to exercise independent
legal judgment over defendant's asserted claims.
Notably, defendant's manipulative behavior has continued on
appeal, with defendant filing several letters directed to the
court complaining of appellate counsel's failure to pursue what
he believes are meritorious issues.
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subjective perception of events."

State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377,

382 (Utah App. 1997); accord Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274.
The determination of whether a defendant's complaints about
appointed counsel amount to good cause for appointment of
substitute counsel rests "within the sound discretion of the
trial court."

Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 121; accord Pursifell,

746 P.2d at 272. Of course, in exercising that discretion, the
trial court must make some "meaningful inquiry" into the
circumstances prompting the request.
960, 964 (Utah App. 1998).

State v. Vessev, 967 P.2d

Examining the cause of the breakdown

in an attorney-client relationship is pivotal to determining
whether the court is constitutionally required to appoint new
counsel.

Scales, 946 P.2d at 382.

In this case, the trial court inquired repeatedly and at
length into the circumstances prompting defendant's persistent
requests for new counsel. Defendant first raised the issue at
his preliminary hearing.

R. 359: 70, 73. Because defendant made

his request only after all parties were present in the courtroom,
the court proceeded with the scheduled hearing, noting that the
record of the hearing would be available for later review by
defendant's new attorney.

Id. at 78.

In a subsequent motions hearing, after defendant renewed his
request, the court reiterated the conditions under which it could
appoint substitute counsel:
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Defendant:

The only way I could get other
counsel is to hire them
myself, correct, your Honor,
to pay them myself?

Court:

Yes, sir, or if

there

is a

conflict of interest as it
relates to matters.
But I
haven't seen that to this
point in time. And there's no
allegation relative to that.
Discuss these
Killpack. He
capable legal
Sit down with

matters with Mr.
is competent,
counsel. . . .
him.

R. 360: 40-41 (emphasis added).

The next hearing addressed

defendant's suppression motion.

At that time, defendant informed

the court that he wanted appointed counsel to represent him (R.
361: 3) .
At a final pretrial conference, defendant asserted that he
had a conflict of interest and again asked for new counsel.
362: 6.

The following exchange documents the issue:
Defendant:

I'm asking for a new attorney
at this time, your Honor.
He's not working for me, your
Honor. . . . I've asked him
for numerous copies of
reasonable demands, reasonable
demands, your Honor,
reasonable demands of an
attorney. I've asked him for
fingerprints on this evidence,
I've asked him for an
evidentiary hearing, I've
asked him for cross
examination on these
witnesses' hearsay testimony,
and this man just isn't here
for me, your Honor.
18

R.

Id.

Defense cnsl:

I'm unaware of a conflict, Judge.

Court:

Nor am I.

Defendant then reiterated that he wanted a different

attorney and that he did not want to represent himself because
the charges were so serious.

Id. at 8, 9.

Defense counsel

interjected:
We did have a discussion one other time about
the way public policy and statutes require
the appointment of counsel under the contract
that Utah County has chosen to go forward,
and the nature of the conflict of interest,
so that has been discussed with [defendant]
both on and off the record, and it was my
understanding that he didn't care to have me
represent him, but that we were unable to
identify a legal conflict of interest.
Id. at 9-10.

The court agreed with defense counsel's

perceptions.

Id. at 10.

When defendant persisted in his claim that counsel was not
representing him adequately in his "fight for the rest of [his]
life," defense counsel responded that all of defendant's issues
"that I feel have a legal basis we've explored to their full
capacity."9

Id. at 11.

After further discussion, the court finally ruled, WI

9

As an example of his counsel's lack of representation,
defendant cited defense counsel's failure to pursue his request
to re-test the marijuana seized by the police. R. 362: 11.
Hearing this, the prosecution volunteered that defense counsel
had called three times during the previous week on the matter,
and that the State had stipulated to the re-testing. Id.
19

decline your request for the appointment of different counsel.
Mr. Killpack is capable, competent counsel, he has handled
numerous felonies and numerous felony jury trials before, and I
think what you're going to have to do, sir, is to cooperate with
Mr. Killpack."

Id. at 13. The court also reduced its ruling to

writing, concluding that "the defendant refused his courtappointed counsel for unjustified reasons and, therefore, waived
his right to counsel.'7

See R. 330-31 or addendum A.

In context, the trial court's ruling on defendant's request
for substitute counsel reflects a correct legal judgment that
defendant had not demonstrated a conflict of interest with his
court-appointed attorney and that, consequently, he had not shown
the necessary good cause for appointment of different counsel.
See Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 121. Where, as the court found
here, a defendant unjustifiably rejects court-appointed counsel,
such action is properly deemed a knowing and voluntary waiver of
counsel.
121;

Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 J20 n.4; Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at

United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983);

Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1980); McKee v.
Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 930-31 (2nd Cir. 1981).

As a result, if

this Court chooses to consider defendant's argument that he did
not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, that
argument fails.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 13

day of September, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

H/n^_

C MfiJc__

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
STATE OP UTAH,
RULING ON MOTIONS
Plaintiff,

vs.
RODGER VANCLEAVE,
Defendant(s).

Case No. 971400387 PS
Judge Lynn W. Davis

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Lynn C. Davis
presiding, on the 30th day of December, 1997. The Defendant was
present, in person, appearing pro se with Steven B. KillpacJc, public
defender, as standby counsel. The State was represented by Deputy
Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor.

The Court considered a number

of pleadings filed by the Defendant following the jury verdict
rendered on August 27, 1997. The Defendant was again admonished to
use the services of appointed counsel following which the Defendant
indicated a desire to argue the motions himself and agreed that Mr.
KillpacJc could remain as standby counsel for the hearing.

Being

advised in the premises, the Court orders the following:

Notice of Intent to Appeal dated 11/11/97
The Court notes that the notice is properly filed and is a first
step to perfection of an appeal of the verdict of the jury and the
sentence of the Court.

Conflicts counsel Margaret Lindsay has been

appointed to represent the Defendant in the pursuit of his appeal and
for all proceedings hereafter.

Motion for New Trial date 11/10/97
This motion consists of two arguments.

The first is that

statements of the Defendant were allowed into trial in violation of
his rights under the 5th amendment to the United States Constitution.
The second is that the Defendant was not allowed to have substitute
counsel appointed, forcing him to choose between Mr. Killpack or

appearance pro

se.

The Court has already considered and ruled upon the 5th amendment
claim.

The Court allowed the Defendant to object to the introduction

of the statements during the trial and considered evidence on the
request to suppress the evidence.

The Court found that the Defendant

was properly advised of his rights per the Miranda decision, waived
those rights and made the statements introduced as evidence.

The

Defendant has offered nothing beyond his continued denial that he was
advised of or waived any rights or made any statements. The motion to
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exclude is denied.

If the motion is a request for a new trial based

on a claim that the first trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by
the introduction of the testimony, that motion is also denied.
The Defendant does not have the right to select appointed counsel
to represent him.

This Court has carefully monitored discovery and

pre-trial preparation in this case through a series of pre-trial
meetings and hearings.

This Court has monitored the progress of this

case and Mr. Killpack1s efforts and concludes that Mr. Killpack has
made every effort and attempt to conscientiously represent the
Defendant.

When the Defendant indicated a desire to have an attorney

other than Mr. Killpack the Court attempted to understand the reason
and found no defensible basis for the request.

Communication, even if

difficult because of the Defendant's imprisonment, has continued
through this case.

The Defendant and Mr. Killpack have consulted

freely and often during all hearings including the trial of this
matter.

Actions taken or not taken by Mr. Killpack with respect to

evidence and witnesses have been justifiable and understandable trial
strategies. When the Defendant elected to represent himself pro

se

rather than have Mr. Killpack speak for him the Court repeatedly urged
the Defendant to use Mr. Killpack instead.

Moreover, Mr. Killpack

remained as a resource for the Defendant to consult at the order of
the Court.

This Court concludes that the Defendant refused his court

appointed counsel for unjustified reasons and, therefore, waived his
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right to counsel.

Second Motion for New Trial dated 11/10/97
This motion is a re-statement of the challenge to the
introduction of the incriminating statements of the Defendant made
during trial and during the motion addressed above.

This Court has

found that the Defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at the appropriate time and made the
incriminating statements after a knowing waiver of those rights. As
an issue of fact, the Court has rejected the Defendants claims that
the warnings were never given and the statements never made.

The

second motion is denied.

Motion for Lower Degree of Offense dated 11/10/97
The Court treats this as a motion under U.C.A. Section 76-3-402,
(1953) as amended.

The Court finds that the Defendant has been on

probation, parole or in custody since 1989 on a variety of serious
offenses including forgery, possession of controlled substances and
burglary.

He has a demonstrated history of abuse of controlled

substances leading, by his own admission, to the commission of a
number of criminal offenses. The history and character of the
Defendant do not support a reduction in degree of offense under the
statute.
The character and nature of this crime also do not support a
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reduction.

Even if viewed in it's most benign characterization, what

was done here was the transportation of equipment with the intended
purpose of allowing someone to manufacture methamphetamine.

While

that was being done the defendant had a loaded .357 magnum handgun at
his feet. He is or was an admitted user of methamphetamine.

The

Defendant acknowledges that the use of methamphetamine has led him to
be involved in substantial amounts of criminal conduct. The
transportation of the equipment necessary for a "lab" to create
methamphetamine is a critical part of the overall production of a
substance that has the potential for similar conduct from large
numbers of customers who would receive the drug which would eventually
be made and sold.

This Court views this offense as a very serious

offense with significant potential for harm to the citizens of this
state and patently rejects the argument that the degree of offense
should be reduced because of the nature of the offense committed.
The Defendant's motion for a reduction in categorization of
offense is denied.

Uotion for a New Trial (Sufficiency of the Evidence)
dated 11/10/97
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that proof of any one of the
subsections (i) through (v) of U.C.A. section 58-37d-3(1)(b) may
establish or prove a "clandestine laboratory operation". Moreover,
proof of knowing or intentional violation of any one of the
subsections (a) through (g) of U.C.A. section 58-37d-4(l) is a
5

violation of the act.

The jury was instructed accordingly.

The

evidence in this case supported the juryfs conclusion that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed laboratory equipment
or supplies (58-37d-4(1)(b)) with intent to "engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation" by transporting supplies and/or equipment for
the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine (58-37d-3(l)(b)(ii)). The
transportation was committed in conjunction with the possession of a
firearm, properly making the offense a first degree felony under
U.C.A. section 58-37d-5(l)(a).

The Defendant's motion for a new trial

or a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict based upon
sufficiency of the evidence is denied.

Motion for a New Trial dated "September, 1997"
This is a motion based upon a claim that certain witnesses'
testimony should have been compelled by the Defense or that because
evidence from these witnesses is now available, a new trial should be
granted under a theory of newly discovered or availaible evidence. The
motion is denied under either theory.
The Defendant describes 4 sources of evidence that he says should
have been arranged for and presented on his behalf by Mr. Killpack.
They include testimony from "Joan", purported to be the owner of the
car he was driving who would claim ownership of the car and its
contents and exonerate the Defendant from knowing or intentional
possession of the laboratory equipment; testimony from a Utah State
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official regarding the treatment of evidence and the destruction of
seized laboratory equipment and supplies; proof of a release from
parole issued by the State of New Mexico; and, finally, testimony from
the registered owner of the handgun recovered from under the driver's
seat of the car the Defendant was driving.
Mr. Killpack proffered that an attempt was made to locate "Joan"
before the trial began but she could not be found.

In any event, the

type of testimony suggested by the Defendant would have required her
to surrender herself to the jurisdiction of Utah courts and confess to
a very serious crime.

There is no method by which either the State or

the Defense could have compelled that kind of testimony.

Moreover,

even if "Joan" had appeared and testified that she owned the car and
the laboratory, it is unlikely that a different verdict would have
been rendered.

Personal property that the Defendant admitted owning

and placing in the car trunk was next to the partially opened bags
containing the laboratory equipment.

A recipe for the production of

methamphetamine was tucked with correspondence directed to the
Defendant above the sun visor in the passenger compartment of the car.
The Defendant admitted that he was being paid cash to transport the
lab to Ogden.A Moan* wasn't present when the car was stopped.

She

could never testify as to what the Defendant knew or didn't know,
intended or didn't intend.

Whatever she owned or whatever stake she

may have had in the events, the evidence was that the Defendant
knowingly and intentionally participated in the transportation of the
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laboratory equipment with the requisite intent•
Mr. Killpack did not err in not compelling the testimony of
"Joan" since he could never have compelled her testimony and was not
given sufficient information to locate her in any event.

Even if her

testimony were now available, which the Defendant has failed to
demonstrate to be the case, it is unlikely that a different verdict
would result upon a re-trial.
The testimony of the proposed expert from the State lab Team,
Clark Lund, would have been cumulative and would also not lead to a
different verdict.

Experts from the State Crime Lab did testify at

the trial of this matter and were questioned extensively about
procedures and policies regarding evidence and destruction of
evidence.

The testimony of the expert witnesses regarding the

destroyed evidence consisted of their view of photographs of the
evidence seized and reading a list of items seized made at the time of
seizure.

There was no chemical testing or scientific evaluation of

the evidence that was admitted.

(Marijuana was seized and tested but

the jury acquitted the Defendant of the charge of possession of
marijuana. A substance suspected of being the precursor ephedrine was
tested and determined to not be ephedrine leading to the dismissal,
prior to trial, of the precursor charge.)

Even if Mr. Lund were to

testify that the officers violated procedure in destroying the
equipment seized rather than preserving the items for use at trial,
such a breach would not have justified exclusion of the photographs or
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written lists and descriptions of the seized evidence.

The officers

who seized the items and the experts who concluded from the
descriptions that the items were laboratory equipment were crossexamined by the Defendant and challenged about the destruction of the
evidence.

The same cross-examination would have been conducted had

Mr. Lund testified.

In any event, the Defendant has never proffered

or demonstrated that Mr. Lund would testify that any procedures were
violated.

The best evidence before this Court is that all proper

procedures were followed.

It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that

the testimony of Mr. Lund would result in a different verdict were the
case to be re-tried.
The evidence relating to a release from parole by the State of
New Mexico would have been irrelevant in this trial.

The evidence was

that the Defendant was a parolee from the State of Utah.

The State of

New Mexico had no legal authority to release the Defendant from his
Utah parole.

He was arrested on a parole warrant.

His parole was

revoked and he was transported from the Utah State Prison for all
proceedings in this case after his initial bail hearing.

He still has

not obtained or shown any kind of release from parole to this Court.
Even if he has or can obtain a parole release from the State of New
Mexico, a new trial in this case would not be justified since such a
document would not produce a different result.
Finally, any testimony of the owner of the gun would be
irrelevant and would not produce a different result in a re-trial of
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this case.

The Defendant testified that he had seen the gun under the

driver's seat before he was stopped by the officer.
case was possession of the gun, not ownership.
of the stop, the owner did not possess the gun.
possessed the gun or no one did.
Defendant knew and intended.

The issue in this

Clearly, at the time
Either the Defendant

The issue hangs on what the

The owner of the gun, whoever that may

be (the Defendant has never identified that person), would be
incapable of explaining what the Defendant knew or intended.

The

testimony would have added nothing to the trial and does not justify a
new trial.
The evidence described by the Defendant in this motion does not
support a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial since it
is either still not available, speculative or irrelevant.

None of the

evidence would likely have produced a different result at the original
trial nor does it justify a new trial. The Defendant's motion is
denied.

Motion to Dismiss based upon 120 Day Notice
This motion was made at the beginning of the trial of this case
and renewed, in writing, following the jury verdict.

The notice was

not properly addressed to the prosecutor's office and, although there
is proof of delivery to the County, there is no proof of delivery to
the Utah County Attorney's Office.
describe the crimes charged.

The notice does not completely

After sending the notice, the Defendant
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agreed to a series of court dates and a continuance to accommodate
Defense motions.

N

V
The trial date of August 26 was the first open trial *
JSo*\e.
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date available to counsel and the Court.
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At no time during any of the \

pre-trial hearings on April 14th, 21st, 28th, June 12th or July 1st did >^ v
X . *

the Defendant attempt to bring the 120 day notice to the attention of
the Court or the prosecution.

$ *
\

The Court finds that the failure to try * ^
)

this case until less than two weeks after 120 days following the
notice sent by the Defendant was based upon good cause because of the
congestion of the Court's calendar.

Furthermore, the Defendant waived

the requirement by failing to object to the dates set for
consideration of defense motions and the date set for trial. The Court
incorporates, by reference, the findings previously made on this
issue. The motion to dismiss was and is denied.
DATED this

27

day of Januaif$7 1998.
BY THE COURT:

LYflN W. DAVIS
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARGARET LINDSEY
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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